from Anastasia Pyschny
DOI: 10.36206/BP2020.01
The SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus was first detected in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 and has spread rapidly around the world from there. In Germany, the virus was detected for the first time at the end of January 2020 in the district of Starnberg in Bavaria.[1] This was the starting signal for a whole series of measures by the federal government, which were also taken in coordination with the state governments.[2] The most important precautions taken in the first five months were[3]:
The measures generally came into force with immediate effect or applied retroactively - as in the case of the regulation on short-time working allowance. The speed with which political decisions had to be made can be seen as an intensification of a problematic trend that is increasingly replacing "political planning" with "flexible, short-term adjustment behaviour".[4] Many governments appeared to have been overwhelmed by the coronavirus crisis management, which within the European Union was particularly the case for Italy and the United Kingdom.
Spain.[5] The federal government's handling of the case has been recognised due to the comparatively low mortality rate and high testing capacities in the national[6] and international[7] much praise in the press coverage. German Chancellor Angela Merkel was often recognised as a "crisis manager".[8] titled. Observers of daily political events were unanimous: the time has come for the executive.
However, the longer this "hour" lasted, the more the - generally high - public acceptance of the government's measures fell: While three quarters of Germans eligible to vote were still satisfied with the government's crisis management in March of this year, this was the case for 72 per cent in April, 67 per cent in May and 62 per cent in June.[9] It is obvious that the increasing scepticism was primarily related to the scope of the measures: contact and assembly bans, curfews, distancing rules, entry restrictions, closures of public institutions such as schools, daycare centres, restaurants and shops, as well as sanctions for violations, raised doubts about how strong the state can and should be in the crisis.
It is true that many European countries, such as Italy, Spain and France, had stricter exit restrictions than Germany. In these countries, the population was only allowed to leave the house with a pass for several weeks. However, it is also true that many of the government measures taken in Germany massively interfered with public life and the economic and individual freedom of every citizen. Fundamental rights were - and are - restricted by the protective measures, although it is legally disputed how far these restrictions may go. Monitoring the measures adopted by the government is one of the most important tasks of parliament. However, the coronavirus outbreak has not left the German Bundestag unscathed.
With its 709 members, the Bundestag is the second largest parliament in the world. In times of the coronavirus pandemic, a gathering of this size poses a high risk of infection. Especially because the average age of the members of parliament is just under 50, which is the age at which more severe courses of the disease can occur from a medical point of view.[10]
In order to avoid the risk of contagion and still ensure the Bundestag's ability to act, all MPs voted in favour of the amendment to the Rules of Procedure (GOBT) on 25 March 2020 - with three abstentions. According to the newly inserted Section 126a, the Bundestag is "quorate if more than a quarter of the members are present in the chamber."[11] This regulation also applies to committee meetings, where it is also possible to use electronic means of communication to pass resolutions. The amendments were made in deviation from Sections 45 and 67 GOBT, according to which at least half of the members of parliament must be present for resolutions in plenary and in committees. The new paragraph can be repealed by the Bundestag at any time and expires on 31 December 2020.[12]
The adaptation of the GOBT was the formal, but not the only change to parliamentary work: a new seating arrangement at a distance, committee and parliamentary group meetings by video or telephone conference, shortened agendas and meeting weeks as well as a changed procedure for roll-call votes determine the current everyday life of MPs in parliament. As there was inter-party agreement on the measures, they were also viewed favourably by the opposition. Member of the Bundestag Jürgen Trittin (Alliance 90/The Greens) assured ZDF: "The Bundestag works. We scrutinise the government and we will not simply wave through what it presents as a government without comment."[13]
It remains to be clarified how and to what extent the opposition parties commented on the government's proposals and measures. In the course of the coronavirus pandemic, there was increasing criticism that the opposition was making too little use of its control options: "The opposition has hardly anything to counter the course of the Federal Government and Chancellor, which seems to have almost no alternative," was the accusatory headline "Coronavirus crisis paralyses opposition" on tagesschau.de on 22 April 2020.[14] Political scientist Stephan Bröchler also criticised the management of the opposition and warned of the consequences of a "super-consensus democracy" in which the opposition would be more "co-ruler" than "dissident".[15] These statements call into question the parliament's ability to act, as the control function is one of parliament's genuine tasks alongside the legislative function.
In accordance with the logic of the "new dualism", according to which the government majority and the parliamentary opposition are antipodes, the control function is performed differently by members of the government parliamentary groups than by members of the opposition parliamentary groups. The former pursue, among other things, the goal of keeping the government in office and ensuring its re-election. However, this does not prevent them from exercising control.[16] To this end, they primarily use informal channels of control, for example in the course of parliamentary group working groups, which are often also attended by ministers[17] or occasionally from committee meetings[18].
In contrast, the motivation of the opposition groups is rather to criticise the government with the help of formal rights of questioning and information in order to appear more competent and to distinguish themselves as an alternative to the government. According to Sections 100 et seq. of the GOBT, the formal rights of scrutiny include
It should also be borne in mind that not only the coalition parties but also the parliamentary opposition can exercise informal control.[19] It seems obvious that the opposition parties used informal channels of control even in times of coronavirus. Political scientist Suzanne S. Schüttemeyer noted in this regard: "The opposition was informed by the Chancellor and the ministries about planned legislation and decisions and was able to have its say."[20] Former Bundestag Director Wolfgang Zeh also noted that the government undoubtedly held talks not only with the coalition parties but also with the opposition parties following the outbreak of the coronavirus: "As with the state governments, informal preliminary clarifications naturally also take place with and between the parliamentary groups in the Bundestag. Politically, no government can afford to operate without feedback from the parliamentary forces."[21] In contrast to the informal control activities of members of the government parliamentary groups[22] and opposition parliamentary groups, the use of formal control instruments by the parliamentary opposition can be statistically analysed. Especially in times of corona, a closer look at this use seems overdue against the background of its critical assessment. For this reason, the use of the opposition's rights of scrutiny, i.e. minor interpellations and written and oral questions, which were mostly used in the last electoral periods, is analysed below for the first five months after the outbreak of the coronavirus until the parliamentary summer recess.[23]
Political scientist Karl-Rudolf Korte divides this period into two phases: "The first phase of the pandemic was logically about civil protection. The focus was on the government rather than the opposition - and everyone was in agreement." Korte describes the second phase as the "phase of opening policy", in which different interests increasingly prevailed and which, in his opinion, could develop into a "great moment for the opposition".[24] In order to be able to compare both phases, they are considered one after the other.
In February 2020, the number of cases of Covid-19 infection in Germany was low, before rising rapidly in mid-March and only being brought under control again at the end of April.[25] During this period, the opposition parliamentary groups used minor interpellations, written questions and oral questions less frequently than in the same period of the previous year (see Table 1). However, the decline is moderate and must be put into perspective when compared to the average monthly use of control instruments in the current legislative period up until the outbreak of the virus.
Control instrument |
February 2020 |
March 2020 |
April 2020 |
Ø usage per month |
Ø usage per month in the same period of the previous year February to April 2019 | Ø usage per month
19 WP1 |
Small questions | 173 | 407 | 148 | 243 | 289 | 250 |
Written questions | 513 | 428 | 523 | 488 | 519 | 481 |
Oral questions2 | 125 | 71 | 151 | 116 | 148 | 126 |
Source: Documentation and Information System (DIP) for parliamentary proceedings
1 Calculation of the average value from the month following the formation of the government in April 2018 to the end of January 2020, excluding the parliamentary summer recesses in July and August 2018 and 2019.
2 Include all questions put to the Federal Government in plenary sessions.
The decline is most evident in the use of oral questions. Between February and April 2020, an average of 116 questions were put to the government in plenary sessions each month. This represents a decrease of 27.6 per cent compared to the same period in the previous year, when an average of 148 oral questions were asked per month, and a decrease of 7.9 per cent compared to the average monthly use of 126 oral questions in the current electoral term. As oral questions are asked in plenary and therefore require the physical presence of MPs and government representatives, it is reasonable to assume that their use was avoided more frequently due to the risk of infection with Covid-19 and the protective measures therefore taken by Parliament. Britta Haßelmann, First Parliamentary Secretary of Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, emphasised the constant balancing act: "Here in Berlin, we are trying to keep Parliament fit for work and must always weigh up the meeting, the deliberation, the decision and also the control of the government against the protection against infection."[26]
The differences are smaller when comparing minor interpellations and written questions. In the first phase of the pandemic, an average of 243 minor interpellations were submitted per month. This is almost 16 per cent fewer than in the same period of the previous year (289) and 2.8 per cent fewer than the monthly average for the legislative period up to the outbreak of the virus (250). Written enquiries were only used less frequently compared to the previous year (488 compared to a monthly average of 519). Compared to the average use per month in the electoral term before the outbreak of the coronavirus, the use of written questions increased slightly from 488 to 481.
In contrast to the oral and written questions[27] small questions must be submitted in writing and answered in writing and can therefore be categorised as a home office-friendly procedure. Small questions always require the approval of at least five per cent of all MPs or a parliamentary group, for which preparatory agreements are necessary. However, this preparation can also be carried out from the home office by means of telephone and video conferences. Against this background, it could be criticised that this control instrument was not used even more, so that the comparatively sharp decline in oral questions could have been compensated for.
This objection cannot be completely refuted, but it can be mitigated. A detailed comparison of the use of oral questions and minor enquiries reveals that there were offsetting trends (see Figure 1). Accordingly, fewer oral questions were asked in February and March than in the same period of the previous year, but more minor enquiries than in the previous year. In the lockdown month of March, for example, the use of oral questions fell many times over compared to the previous year (from 241 in March 2019 to 71 in March 2020), while the number of minor questions rose by a further ten per cent from an already above-average figure of 349 minor questions in March 201928 to 407 minor questions in March 2020. This is the highest number of minor interpellations submitted per month in the entire 19th parliamentary term.
Source: Documentation and Information System (DIP) for parliamentary proceedings.
It was only in April that the use of minor enquiries fell behind the previous year's figure, albeit drastically by more than half (to 148 compared to 349 in the previous year). At the same time, however, the use of Oral Questions more than doubled (from 67 in April 2019 to 151 in April 2020). It is difficult to say why this turnaround occurred. In any case, it shows that the Bundestag was already busy discussing the issue again in April. In addition, the opposing trends in the use of oral questions and minor interpellations indicate that there was no month in which the overall use of questioning rights was below average compared to the previous year. On the contrary, the opposition made greater use of one questioning instrument within a month, while making comparatively less use of another right of scrutiny. This does not change the fact that oral questions and minor questions were used slightly less frequently overall in this first phase of the pandemic. However, this decline did not occur simultaneously within this period, meaning that a sharp decline in the overall use of the designated scrutiny rights by the opposition cannot be observed at any time.
At a press conference on the coronavirus rules on 6 May 2020, Chancellor Merkel said: "The first wave of the global pandemic is over."[29] From this point onwards, the focus was no longer on bans and restrictions, but on the question of whether, when and how the previously imposed regulations could be relaxed or lifted. As this phase is still ongoing, we can only focus on its beginning until the parliamentary summer recess, i.e. the months of May and June.
On average, a greater use of formal scrutiny rights can be observed for this period (see Table 2). Minor interpellations and written and oral questions were not only used more frequently than in the same period of the previous year (1) and than the monthly average for the 19th parliamentary term up to the outbreak of the virus (2), but also more frequently than in the first phase of the pandemic (see Table 2 and Table 1). However, the differences are moderate. Just as a slight overall decline in the use of formal control instruments can be observed for the first phase, a moderate overall increase in usage behaviour can be observed in the second pandemic phase. In a comparison of the two months, this increase is more pronounced in June than in May.
The biggest increase was in the use of oral questions. Compared to the first phase of the pandemic, their monthly use increased by an average of 30.2 per cent (151 to 116) and by 19.8 per cent compared to the election period until the outbreak of the virus (151 to 126). In comparison to the same period of the previous year, the average monthly increase was 8.6 per cent (151 to 139). Regardless of which comparison period is used, this data shows something very important: before the parliamentary summer recess, there was an above-average amount of discussion in Parliament - more than at the beginning of the pandemic and more than before the outbreak of the coronavirus.
Control instrument |
May 2020 |
June 2020 |
Ø usage per month |
Ø usage per month in the same period of the previous year May to June 2019 |
Ø usage per month 19. WP1 |
Small questions | 186 | 340 | 263 | 233 | 250 |
Written questions | 484 | 543 | 514 | 477 | 481 |
Oral questions2 | 140 | 162 | 151 | 139 | 126 |
Source: Documentation and Information System (DIP) for parliamentary proceedings
1 Calculation of the average value from the month following the formation of the government in April 2018 to the end of January 2020, excluding the parliamentary summer recesses in July and August 2018 and 2019.
2 Include all questions put to the Federal Government in plenary sessions.
There is much to suggest that the opposition groups will continue to make greater use of the control instruments available to them. After all, there are numerous conceivable ways and aid measures to overcome and mitigate the consequences of the coronavirus pandemic, which is why future government proposals will generally offer many points of attack for the opposition. In addition, the 2021 federal elections are drawing ever closer, forcing the opposition parties to raise their profile for electoral reasons.
The statistical analyses on the use of formal control rights in coronavirus times show minimal to moderate differences compared to the same period of the previous year and the election period up to the outbreak of the virus. While the most frequently used control instruments (minor interpellations, written and oral questions) were used less frequently on average in the first three months after the outbreak of the virus[30]their use is slightly above average for the months of May and June this year. The differences were most evident in the use of oral questions, which decreased the most in the first phase of the pandemic (up to an average of 27.6 per cent per month compared to the same period in the previous year) and increased the most in the second phase (up to 19.8 per cent compared to the monthly average in the 19th parliamentary term until the outbreak of the virus). The latter indicates that there was more debate in the Bundestag before the parliamentary summer break than before the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic.
These observations are of great importance for the reputation of the Bundestag and the parliamentary opposition in particular, as they show that the use of formal government control has been relatively stable in coronavirus times. On this basis, there is no need to fear a "super-consensus democracy", nor is there any sign of a "great moment for the opposition". On the contrary, the opposition groups have shown themselves capable of acting in a challenging time with changed working conditions. They can and should therefore be more self-confident in their external communication.
Christian Lindner took a - rather unfortunate - step in this direction when he announced the end of the "great unanimity on the issue of crisis management" in the plenary session in April 2020.[31] announced. This statement was ambiguous for the opposition's public image. Although Lindner made it clear that the government could expect more criticism from this point onwards, he also used the term "unanimity" to underpin the media's traditional image of a paralysed opposition at the start of the coronavirus pandemic. This image does not correspond to reality in figures: although formal rights of scrutiny were used less frequently overall in the first phase of the pandemic (early February to the end of April 2020), an average of more than 100 oral questions, 200 minor questions and 400 written questions were submitted to the Federal Government each month (see Table 1). Even if one considers that not all of these questions relate to the Federal Government's coronavirus protection measures or their effects, the volume of (follow-up) questions does not allow the conclusion to be drawn that the opposition and majority parliamentary groups are unanimous in their approach to crisis management.
Although it could be argued that Lindner was alluding to unanimity in the general crisis management guidelines, in this case he would firstly have had to communicate this and secondly it would have to be questioned whether the unanimity would actually be over according to this interpretation.
There is no doubt that it is not easy for opposition parties to make themselves heard in the media in times of coronavirus. It is therefore all the more important that they utilise opportunities for external communication to clearly and unambiguously refer to their reliable counterpart of parliamentary control.
In addition to frequently used control instruments such as minor questions, written and oral questions, the opposition groups would also have the opportunity to have government decisions on corona measures scrutinised by convening a commission of enquiry or a committee of enquiry. While the former serves to obtain comprehensive information for the purpose of future decisions with the involvement of external and, above all, scientific advisors, the latter pursues the internal parliamentary clarification of grievances and scandals of the government and administration, for which experts and witnesses can be heard.[32]
For Marco Buschmann, Parliamentary Secretary of the FDP, both control instruments can be considered, although he would favour a commission of enquiry.[33] On 30 May 2020, the AfD announced its intention to "request the establishment of a committee of enquiry into the federal government's coronavirus crisis management".[34] Bündnis 90/Die Grünen and Die Linke have not yet commented on the establishment of these control bodies.[35]
The partial silence is not surprising insofar as the convening of one of these bodies does not appear to make sense for the opposition for two reasons: Firstly, the "principle of discontinuity" applies to both bodies, which means that the activities of a commission of enquiry or a committee of enquiry must be completed by the end of the current legislative period.[36] As the 19th parliamentary term will come to a regular end in just over a year, there will not be much time to systematically analyse and evaluate such a comprehensive topic as government action at the beginning of the coronavirus pandemic.
Secondly, and more importantly, the convening of these committees would offer the opposition parties hardly any opportunities to raise their profile. The members of an Enquête Commission familiarise themselves comprehensively with complex topics and therefore carry out purely factual work. However, this is not effective in terms of publicity and would therefore not offer the opposition the opportunity to make a name for itself as a supervisory body.
In return, a committee of enquiry is effective in terms of publicity, but the reason for setting it up seems to require explanation. What grievance or scandal should a coronavirus committee of enquiry uncover? What would be the concrete suspicion (especially against the background of the comparatively low mortality rate in Germany) that would indicate gross misconduct on the part of the German government? Against this background, the output of such a committee of enquiry seems uncertain. Contrary to the genuine orientation of such a control instrument, this could even prove positive for the external image of the Federal Government, provided that no self-inflicted failure could be proven. In this case, the opposition parties would have unintentionally provided the government with a stage by setting up a committee of enquiry and would themselves be weakened.
In order for the parliamentary opposition to be perceived more strongly as a government watchdog in times of coronavirus, it must therefore not do more, but rather speak confidently about what it has already done. In times of a dominant executive, the opposition groups would not only strengthen their own image, but also the public image of parliament.
[1] Julia Merlot: The unhappy journey of patient zero, Der Spiegel, 16 May 2020, https://spiegel.de/wissenschaft/medizin/erster-corona-fall-in-deutschland-die-unglueckliche-reise-von- patientin-0-a-2096d364-dcd8-4ec8-98ca-7a8ca1d63524.
[2] On the importance and ability of state parliaments to act in coronavirus times, see Corinna Koerber: Business as usual? The COVID-19 crisis in German state legislatures, March 2020, https://countingcountsblog. wordpress.com/ 2020/03/25/business-as-usual-the-covid-19-crisis-in-german-state-legislatures/.
[3] The months of February (first month after the outbreak of the novel coronavirus) to the end of June 2020 (start of the parliamentary summer recess) represent the period under review for the use of formal control instruments by the opposition parliamentary groups in the remainder of this issue of Blickpunkt. For this reason, with the exception of the BMG's first emergency ordinance, only precautions within this period are mentioned.
[4] Henning Laux; Hartmut Rosa: Die beschleunigte Demokratie - Überlegungen zur Weltwirtschaftskrise, in: WSI-Mitteilungen 10/2009, https: //wsi.de/data/ wsimit_2009_10_laux.pdf.
[5] In mid-April, the Australian Institute of Certified Management Accountants (CMA) published a ranking comparing government action at the start of the coronavirus pandemic in almost 100 countries. Italy and Spain brought up the rear in 93rd and 95th place respectively. Germany, on the other hand, ranked 16th. CMA Australia: GRID Index: Tracking the Global Leadership Response in the Covid-19 Crisis, CMA News from 14 April 2020, https://www.cmawebline.org/ontarget/grid-index-tracking-the-global-leadership-response- in-the-covid-19-crisis/.
[6] For example, Susanne Götze: In a country comparison, Germany is very far ahead, Der Spiegel from 14 April 2020, https://www.spiegel.de/wissenschaft/mensch/ im-laender-vergleich-liegt-deutschland-se sehr-weit- vorn-a-ebae15df-eca1-4daf-ae5b-8efcad11ee28.
[7] For example, David Vogel; Benedikt Hofer: Foreign countries declare Germany a coronavirus role model, NZZ podcast from 22 April 2020, https://www.nzz.ch/international/nzz-corona-podast-deutschland-das-corona- model-ld.1552801.
[8] For example Florian Gathmann; Kevin Hagen: Alternativlos, Der Spiegel from April 2020, https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/krisenkanzlerin-angela-merkel-alternativlos-a-9250cee9-ed1c-4bfa-b199- 4c4b96be3849Katharina Schuler: The crisis chancellor is back, Zeit online, 11 March 2020, https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2020-03/angela-merkel-corona-pressekonferenz-jens-spahn or Gathmann.
[9] In June 2020, in contrast to the months of March to May, respondents were not asked about "crisis management", but more generally about their satisfaction with the federal government. In July and August 2020, satisfaction rose again slightly to 63% and 64% respectively. See ARD DeutschlandTREND from March to August 2020, https://www.tagesschau.de/thema/ germanytrend/.
[10] N.N.: Information and assistance for people at higher risk of severe COVID-19 disease progression, Robert Koch Institute, 13 May 2020, https://www.rki.de/DE/Content/InfAZ/N/Neuartiges_Coronavirus/Risikogruppen.html.
[11] German Bundestag: Amendment to the Rules of Procedure of the German Bundestag, printed matter of 25 March 2020, https://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/19/ 181/1918126.pdf.
[12] The paragraph was initially valid until 30 September 2020 and was extended until the end of the year in the 176th session of the Bundestag on September 2020 - against the votes of the AfD parliamentary group.
[13] Johanna Sagmeister: Stress test for parliament, zdfheute from April 2020, https://www.zdf.de/nachrichten/politik/coronavirus-bundestag-stresstest-100.html.
[14] Iris Marx: On a lost cause, tagesschau from 22 April 2020, https://tagesschau.de/inland/analyse-opposition-corona-krise-parteien-101.html.
[15] Stephan Bröchler: Oxygen for democracy, taz of 15 April 2020, https://taz.de/Opposition-in-Coronazeiten/!5675429/.
[16] Sven T. Siefken: Parliamentary Control in Transition. Theory and Practice of the German Bundestag. Studies on Parliamentarism Volume 31, Baden-Baden 2018, p. 227f.
[17] Jürgen von Oertzen: The Parliament of Experts. The roles of members of parliament in the specialised structures of German parliaments. Studies on Parliamentarism, Volume 3, Baden-Baden 2006, p. 281; Florian Meinel: Vertrauensfrage. Zur Krise des heutigen Parlamentarismus, Munich 2019, p. 168f.
[18] Sven T. Siefken: Parlamentarische Kontrolle im Wandel, p. 228 and Jürgen von Oertzen: The Parliament of Experts, p. 281.
[19] Jürgen von Oertzen distinguishes between three forms of control function: controlling by the majority parliamentary groups, public oppositional control and non-public oppositional control in the Cf: Das Expertenparlament, p. 281; on non-public oppositional control, see also pp. 236 - 238.
[20] Suzanne Schüttemeyer: Corona crisis: What consequences does the pandemic have for democracies?, bpb from 20 May 2020, https://www.bpb.de/politik/innenpolitik/coronavirus/310202/demokratie.
[21] Wolfgang Zeh: Zum ausnahmslosen Primat des Parlaments, in: ZParl, vol. 2 (2020), p. 469 - 473, p. 471.
[22] Although it is not possible to trace the nature and extent of the informal control activities of the government parliamentary groups, there is no question - as for the opposition parliamentary groups - that they were not involved in the government's control activities during the coronavirus pandemic. That is our task". See Rolf Mützenich, Ralph Brinkhaus: The new normal for our democracy too, Der Spiegel, 28 May 2020, https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/die-neue-normalitaet-auch-fuer-unsere-demokratie-a-8bb474b5-465c-4e84-bfb5-62fa-52509e60.
[23] Due to the generally low number of major interpellations and topical hours, no reliable statements can be made about the usage behaviour of the opposition parliamentary groups before and during the coronavirus pandemic.
[24] Raphael Markert in an interview with Karl-Rudolf Korte: "Anwalt der Ungeduld", SZ from May 2020, https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/coronavirus-bundesregierung-opposition-1.4899513.
[25] WHO, Johns Hopkins University: Development of the daily number of newly reported cases of coronavirus (CO-VID-19) in Germany since January 2020, on statista.com from August 2020, https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/1100739/umfrage/entwicklung-der-taeglichen-fallzahl-des-coronavirus-in-deutschland/#professional.
[26] Gudula Geuther: Difficult self-assertion in corona times, deutschlandfunk.de from 6 May 2020, https://deutschlandfunk.de/deutscher-bundestag-schwierige-selbstbehauptung-in.724.de.html?dram:article_id=476166.
[27] Although written questions are asked in writing in accordance with their designation, they are answered orally if they have been formulated for Question Time.
[28] For comparison: the monthly average in the WP is 250 minor enquiries, see Table 1.
[29] N.N.: 6 May 2020: Rules on the coronavirus, from 6 May 2020 on bundeskanzlerin.de, https://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/bkin-de/aktuelles/6-mai-2020-regeln-zum-corona-virus-1755252.
[30] The exception is written questions compared to their use in the legislative period up to the outbreak of the coronavirus. At 488 to 481, their use increased minimally in this comparison (see Table 1).
[31] Plenary minutes of April 2020, 156th session, https://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/19/19157.pdf, S. 19304.
[32] The committee of enquiry is therefore also regarded as a "fighting instrument" of the opposition, Sven Siefken: Parlamentarische Kontrolle im Wandel, p. 195f.
[33] Bayern 2 News: FDP wants parliament to review corona decisions, br from 4 May 2020, https://br.de/nachrichten/meldung/fdp-will-corona-entscheidungen-vom-parlament-ueberpruefen-lassen,3002c27c4.
[34] Richard Strobl; Florian Naumann; Alicia Greil: "Consequential wrong decisions": AfD calls for committee of enquiry
on the government's corona policy, Merkur.de from 30 May 2020, https://www.merkur.de/politik/corona-deutschland-angela-merkel-lockerungen-regeln-soeder-spahn-news-covid-19-afd-untersuchungsausschuss-zr-13775102.html.
[35] The Greens called for the establishment of a "pandemic council", which would, however, only act as an advisory body.
of the Federal Government. See N.N.: Greens call for pandemic council, motion of 1 July 2020,
https://www.bundestag.de/presse /hib/703884-703884.
[36] Enquête commissions can be requested again in a subsequent electoral term, however
must be debated by the Bundestag on their report during the term of their appointment.
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